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Abstract
It has been suggested that we can tell whether two theories are equiv-
alent by comparing the structure that they ascribe to the world. If two
theories posit different structures, then they must be inequivalent. The
aim of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which this desideratum holds
of the different standards of equivalence that are currently on the table.
1 Introduction
There is sometimes a sense in which two theories are equivalent. Equivalent
theories say the same thing about the world, but might go about saying it in
different ways. They are the same theory, just presented to us in different guises;
they might, for example, use different mathematics or be formulated in different
languages. The standard examples of equivalent theories are the Heisenberg
and Schro¨dinger formulations of quantum mechanics and the Hamiltonian and
Lagrangian formulations of classical mechanics.1
Since equivalent theories are supposed to be the same in all significant re-
spects, we have a way to tell when two theories are inequivalent. If two theories
differ in some significant respect, then they must be inequivalent. One way in
which two theories might differ is in the structure that they ascribe to the world.
For example, the Newtonian and Galilean theories of spacetime ascribe differ-
ent amounts of structure to the world. Newtonian spacetime has the structure
necessary to single out a rest frame, while Galilean spacetime does not come
equipped with this structure. Since they ascribe different structure to space-
time, these two theories say different things about the world, and therefore must
be inequivalent.
There are different standards of equivalence that are currently on the table,
and the question of which one we should adopt is currently a subject of sig-
nificant debate. The considerations about structure outlined above suggest a
desideratum that we might use to evaluate standards of equivalence. In order
for a particular standard of equivalence to be satisfactory, it should be the case
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that if two theories are equivalent according to that standard, then they ascribe
the same structure to the world.
Desideratum. If theories T1 and T2 are equivalent, then models of T1 have the
same structure as models of T2.
A standard of equivalence fails to satisfy this desideratum just in case two
theories can be equivalent according to that standard while nonetheless hav-
ing models with different structure. Intuitively, if two theories ascribe different
structure to the world, we can only infer that they are inequivalent if the stan-
dard of equivalence that we adopt satisfies this desideratum. Because we should
be able to make this inference, the standard of equivalence that we adopt should
satisfy the desideratum.
North (2009) has recently relied on the desideratum to argue, contrary to the
standard view, that Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics are inequivalent.
If, as North (2009, p. 72) argues, there are “differences in structure” between
the statespaces of two theories, then they must be inequivalent. Curiel (2014)
agrees with North that Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics are inequivalent.
His argument is different than North’s, but it also relies on something like the
desideratum too. It turns on the idea that the two theories are inequivalent be-
cause “the underlying geometrical structures one uses to formulate each theory
are not isomorphic” (Curiel, 2014, p. 1).
In what follows I will consider two standards of equivalence that are currently
on the table and ask whether they satisfy the desideratum. In order to say
whether they do, we need to make precise what it is for models of different
theories to have the same structure. There are different ways to do this. My aim
is to address these two issues — what standard of equivalence between theories
we should adopt and what notion of sameness of structure between models we
should adopt — in tandem, and work towards a reflective equilibrium between
the two.
2 The model isomorphism criterion
We begin with a basic question: Under what conditions should we consider two
theories equivalent? At the very least, equivalent theories should make the same
empirical predictions. If we can distinguish between two theories on the basis
of some observation, then we should not consider those theories equivalent.
The logical positivists are often credited with the view that empirical equiv-
alence is not only necessary, but also sufficient for full equivalence of theories.
Their idea was that the content of a theory is exhausted by its empirical content,
so if two theories agree about the observable, this means that they have exactly
the same content, which is just another way of saying that they are equivalent
theories. It is now usually thought, however, that empirical equivalence is by
itself too weak a standard of equivalence. In order to be equivalent, theories
must share more in common than just their empirical predictions.
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The first standard that we will consider provides one way of making precise
what else must be shared by two theories in order for them to be equivalent.
Criterion. Theories T1 and T2 are equivalent according to the model isomor-
phism criterion if every model of T1 is isomorphic to a model of T2, and vice
versa.
The thought is that if two empirically equivalent theories are also equivalent
according to the model isomorphism criterion, then this gives us good reason to
think of them as saying the same thing about the world.
Two mathematical objects are said to be isomorphic if there is a bijection
between them that preserves their basic structures. Isomorphism is the standard
notion of ‘sameness of structure’ between mathematical objects. One therefore
trivially sees that the model isomorphism criterion satisfies the desideratum.
Indeed, there is a strong sense in which the desideratum leads one directly to
this standard of equivalence. It is the standard that one arrives at when one
uses the concept of isomorphism to make precise the relation ‘same structure
as’ that appears in the desideratum.
It has recently been argued by Halvorson (2012) that adherents to the se-
mantic view of theories are forced to endorse this standard of equivalence. And
regardless of one’s views on the debate between the semantic and syntactic views
of theories, the idea behind the model isomorphism criterion is tempting. It is
motivated by a desire to interpret a theory ‘literally’ or ‘at face value.’ If one
interprets a theory this way, then one understands the mathematical structure
of a theory’s models as directly mirroring the structure of the world. Theo-
ries whose models are isomorphic are therefore ‘saying the same thing’ about
the world. They are ascribing precisely the same structure to it. Conversely,
theories whose models are not isomorphic must ‘say different things’ about the
world.
Although the model isomorphism criterion satisfies the desideratum, it is a
poor standard of equivalence. It judges too few pairs of theories to be equivalent.
There are a number of examples of this, but for our purposes the following two
will suffice. This first example was used by Winnie (1986) to demonstrate a
similar point.
Example. The theory of linear orders can be formulated in two different ways.
One formulation uses the concept of a non-strict order, while the other uses
the concept of a strict order. In the first case, let Σ1 = {≤} be a signature
where ≤ is a binary relation. The theory of linear orders1 is the Σ1-theory with
axioms saying that ≤ is transitive, antisymmetric, and that any two elements are
comparable under the relation. In the second case, let Σ2 = {<} be a signature
where < is a binary relation. The theory of linear orders2 is the Σ2-theory with
axioms saying that < is asymmetric, transitive, and trichotomous. y
One can easily see that these two theories are not equivalent according to the
model isomorphism criterion. Suppose that M is a model of the theory of linear
orders1 and N is a model of the theory of linear orders2. These two models are
3
not isomorphic.2 There cannot be a bijection between M and N that preserves
their basic structures because ≤ on M is reflexive, while < on N is irreflexive
(since it is asymmetric). Since models of these two theories are not isomorphic,
they are not equivalent according to the model isomorphism criterion, despite
the fact that they intuitively are the same. They both ascribe the same ‘linear
order structure’ to sets, but they use different languages to do so.
The second example has been used to argue against the model isomorphism
criterion before (Barrett, 2015, 2017a).
Example. It is well known that there are different ways to formulate general
relativity. For example, it can be formulated on a smooth manifold with metric
of signature (1-3), and it can be formulated on a smooth manifold with metric
of signature (3-1). There is a strong sense in which these two formulations
of general relativity are equivalent. Indeed, they only differ with respect to a
choice of sign convention (i.e. a choice of whether to assign positive or negative
length to timelike vectors). y
These two formulations of general relativity are inequivalent according to the
model isomorphism criterion. Manifolds with metric can only be isomorphic if
their metrics have the same signature. Since models of these two formulations
of general relativity employ metrics of different signatures, they are not isomor-
phic, and the two theories are therefore inequivalent according to the model
isomorphism criterion.
These examples yield two conclusions. First, they show that the model
isomorphism criterion is too strict a standard of equivalence. There are pairs
of theories that are inequivalent according to the model isomorphism criterion
which we nonetheless want to consider equivalent. In moving from our desidera-
tum to the model isomorphism criterion, we have employed too strict a notion of
‘same structure’. One wants to say that a model of the theory of linear orders1
has the same structure as a model of the theory of linear orders2. Similarly,
one wants to say that a model of (1-3) general relativity and a model of (3-1)
general relativity have the same structure. These two examples simply do not
strike one as cases in which the desideratum can be applied in order to conclude
that the theories are inequivalent. But in both of the examples, the models
of the theories in question are not isomorphic. This brings us to our second
conclusion. When asking questions of equivalence — and when trying to clar-
ify the desideratum — one should not make sameness of structure precise by
using the concept of isomorphism. There are objects that are not isomorphic
but which we nonetheless want to say have the same structure. Examples like
the ones above demonstrate the “inadequacy of isomorphism as the criterion of
structural equivalence” (Winnie, 1986, p. 128).
2In fact, the standard notion of isomorphism in model theory only applies to models that
are in the same signature, so there is a sense in which M and N are trivially not isomorphic.
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3 Categorical equivalence
It is important to address both of these points. Before discussing how one
might appropriately weaken the notion of isomorphism in order to capture a
more adequate notion of ‘sameness of structure’, it will be useful to get a more
liberal standard of theoretical equivalence on the table. There are many to
choose from, but in the last few years one of the most discussed standards
of equivalence has been categorical equivalence. This criterion traces back to
Eilenberg and Mac Lane (1942, 1945), but was only recently introduced into
philosophy of science by Halvorson (2012, 2016) and Weatherall (2016). It has
since been applied to many cases of interest in physics.3
We need to do a bit of work to define categorical equivalence. First note that
the class of models of a theory often has the structure of a category. We will
call this the category of models of the theory. A category C is a collection
of objects with arrows between the objects that satisfy some basic properties.
The arrows in a category C can be thought of as the ‘structure-preserving maps’
between the objects of the category. An object in the category of models of a
theory is just a model of that theory. The arrows between objects in the category
of models encode the relationships that different models of the physical theory
might bear to one another. If T is a first-order theory formulated in a signature
Σ, the category of models Mod(T ) of T has models of T as its objects and
elementary embeddings between models of T as its arrows.4
A functor F : C → D is a structure-preserving map between categories C
and D. One can think of a functor as a ‘translation’ from objects and arrows
of C to objects and arrows of D. A functor F : C → D is full if for all objects
c1, c2 in C and arrows g : Fc1 → Fc2 in D there exists an arrow f : c1 → c2 in
C such that Ff = g. F is faithful if Ff = Fg implies that f = g for all arrows
f : c1 → c2 and g : c1 → c2 in C. F is essentially surjective if for every object
d in D there exists an object c in C such that Fc ∼= d. A functor F : C → D
that is full, faithful, and essentially surjective is called an equivalence. The
categories C and D are equivalent if there exists an equivalence between them.
This gives us the following standard of equivalence between theories.
Criterion. Theories T1 and T2 are categorically equivalent if their categories
of models Mod(T1) and Mod(T2) are equivalent.
When T1 and T2 are physical theories, one also requires that the functor
realizing this equivalence ‘preserves the empirical content of the theories’ in
some sense (Weatherall, 2016; Barrett, 2017a). This additional requirement is
meant to guarantee that the theories in question are empirically equivalent,
and moreover, that their empirical equivalence is respected by the functors that
translate between the theories. Categorical equivalence is capturing a sense in
which two theories are ‘intertranslatable’; one can convert models of the one
theory into models of the other theory, and these translations preserve many of
the theoretical properties that one might take to be significant.
3For a review of recent work see Weatherall (2019) and the references therein.
4For further details see Barrett and Halvorson (2016b) and the references therein.
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In asking whether or not categorical equivalence satisfies our desideratum,
we are asking whether the structure of the models of the theories is preserved
under these translations. If we adopt isomorphism as our notion of sameness of
structure, then categorical equivalence does not satisfy the desideratum. The
two examples above show this. Models of the theory of orders1 are not isomor-
phic to models of the theory of orders2, but these two theories are nonetheless
categorically equivalent. (It is well-known that these two theories are defini-
tionally equivalent, and definitional equivalence entails categorical equivalence
(Barrett and Halvorson, 2016b).) Similarly, models of 1-3 general relativity are
not isomorphic to models of 3-1 general relativity, but these two theories are
categorically equivalent too (Barrett, 2017a).
As we discussed above, however, these two examples give us good reason
to refrain from adopting isomorphism as our notion of sameness of structure
between models. One wants to say, for example, that a model of 1-3 general
relativity and a model of 3-1 general relativity have the same structure, despite
the fact that they are not isomorphic. This structure is simply displayed by
the two models in two different ways, each corresponding to a choice of sign
convention. We therefore want a more liberal notion of sameness of structure
according to which these models have the same structure.
One such notion is suggested by the following considerations. A mathe-
matical object comes equipped with more structure than just its ‘basic level’
of structure. It comes equipped with more structure than just that which we
choose to display in its notation. In particular, it is natural to think of all of
the structures that an object defines as ‘coming for free’ on the object. One
example of this is the case of a metric space (X, d). A metric space naturally
comes equipped with — indeed, the metric defines — a canonical topology τd.
This topology τd is just as much a part of the structure of (X, d) as the metric
d is.
Similarly, a model (M, gab) of 1-3 general relativity comes equipped with
additional structures other than just the 1-3 metric gab. One of these additional
structures that its basic level of structure defines is the 3-1 metric −gab. This
means that a model of 1-3 general relativity can define all of the structures that
a model of 3-1 general relativity has, and vice versa. These models therefore
have the same structure in the sense that each can define all of the structures
of the other. The same holds of models of the two formulations of the theory
of linear orders. The idea here is simple. Objects that are isomorphic have the
same basic level of structure. But a mathematical object comes equipped with
additional definable structures, and it might be — as in these two examples —
that once we take these into account we see that two non-isomorphic objects
have precisely the same structure.
In order to make this notion of sameness of structure precise, we need to
say what it means for two objects to define each others’ structure. Suppose
that Σ1 and Σ2 are signatures. (We assume without loss of generality that they
only contain predicate symbols.) The elements of Σ1 and Σ2 encode the ‘basic
structures’ on the two objects that we will consider. Let A be a Σ1-structure
and B a Σ2-structure. If q ∈ Σ2 is one of the structures on B, then we say
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that the Σ1-structure A explicitly defines q
B if there is a Σ1-formula φ such
that φA = qB . Similarly, the Σ2-structure A explicitly defines p
A if there is
a Σ2-formula ψ such that ψ
B = pA.
We can now state the following notion of sameness of structure.5
Definition. A and B are codeterminate if A explicitly defines qB for every
q ∈ Σ2 and B explicitly defines pA for every p ∈ Σ1.
Codeterminate objects can define each others structures, and intuitively,
they “differ only in their choice of exhibited relations” (Winnie, 1986, p. 75).
For example, the model A = (N,≤) of the theory of linear orders1 and the model
B = (N, <) of the theory of linear orders2, where ≤ and < are given their usual
extensions on the natural numbers, are codeterminate, despite the fact that they
are not isomorphic. One can easily verify that (x ≤ y ∧ x 6= y)A = (x < y)B ,
which means that A explicitly defines all of the elements of Σ2. One can also
verify that B explicitly defines ≤. The models A and B have the same structure.
Indeed, they are both simply the natural numbers under their usual ordering.
The only difference between them is in the way that they choose to display this
structure. The former displays it by exhibiting the relation ≤, the latter by
exhibiting the relation <, and each of these defines the other.
We can now ask whether categorically equivalent theories have codetermi-
nate models. In other words, we want to know whether the desideratum holds
of categorical equivalence when we take codetermination as our standard of
sameness of structure. The aim of the remainder of this section is show that
if we restrict our attention to a particular class of ‘well behaved’ equivalences
between theories, then the answer to this question is yes.
We need some basic preliminaries in order to characterize these well behaved
functors. A reconstrual F of Σ1 into Σ2 is a map from the elements of the
signature Σ1 to Σ2-formulas that takes an n-ary predicate symbol p ∈ Σ1 to
a Σ2-formula Fp(x1, . . . , xn) with n free variables.
6 A reconstrual F : Σ1 →
Σ2 extends to a map from arbitrary Σ1-formulas to Σ2-formulas in the usual
recursive manner. If T1 and T2 are theories in the signatures Σ1 and Σ2, then
we say that a reconstrual F : Σ1 → Σ2 is a translation F : T1 → T2 if T1  φ
implies that T2  Fφ for every Σ1-sentence φ. A translation F gives rise to a
map F ∗ : Mod(T2)→ Mod(T1), which takes models of the theory T2 to models
of the theory T1. One can show that M and F
∗(M) are related to one another
in the following way.
Lemma. Let M be a model of T2 and φ(x1, . . . , xn) a Σ1-formula. Then M 
Fφ[a1, . . . , an] if and only if F
∗(M)  φ[a1, . . . , an].
The map F ∗ naturally extends to a mapping on elementary embeddings so
that F ∗ : Mod(T2) → Mod(T1) is a functor between the categories of models
5This notion of codetermination was proposed by Winnie (1986), though he uses a variety
of implicit definability instead of explicit definability. For more details on the relation between
the two kinds of definability, see Winnie (1986) or Barrett (2017b).
6See Barrett and Halvorson (2016a) for a more comprehensive treatment of reconstruals
and translations.
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of T2 and T1. If f : M → N is an arrow between models of T2, then we
define F ∗(f) = f . One uses the Lemma to verify that F ∗(f) is an elementary
embedding. This means that a translation F : T1 → T2 gives rise to a functor
F ∗ : Mod(T2) → Mod(T1). Functors F ∗ that arise from translations in this
manner will be our ‘well behaved’ functors that we consider.
We can now state the following result.
Proposition. Let Σ1 and Σ2 be disjoint signatures. If F : T2 → T1 is a
translation from the Σ2-theory T2 to the Σ1-theory T1 such that F
∗ : Mod(T1)→
Mod(T2) is a categorical equivalence, then M and F
∗(M) are codeterminate for
every model M of T1.
We need a few more definitions before proving this proposition. If Σ ⊂ Σ+
are signatures, we say that a Σ+-theory T+ is an extension of a Σ-theory T if
T  φ implies that T+  φ for every Σ-sentence φ. When T+ is an extension of
a Σ-theory T , we can define the projection functor Π : Mod(T+)→ Mod(T )
by
Π(M) = M |Σ Π(h) = h
for every model M of T+ and elementary embedding h between models of T+.
Here M |Σ is the Σ-structure obtained from M by forgetting the extensions of
all the predicates not in Σ.
Proof. Let M be a model of T1. If q ∈ Σ2 is a predicate symbol, then the
Lemma implies that qF
∗(M) = FqM , which means that M explicitly defines q.
It takes more work to show that F ∗(M) defines all of the structures of M .
Consider the Σ1 ∪ Σ2-theory T+1 that is defined as follows:
T1 ∪ {∀x(q(x)↔ Fq(x)) : q ∈ Σ2}
T+1 is a definitional extension of T1. Using the fact that F is a translation, one
can show that T+1 is an extension of T2. One can then verify using the Lemma
that the following diagram commutes, where Π1 : Mod(T
+
1 ) → Mod(T1) and
Π2 : Mod(T
+
1 )→ Mod(T2) are the projection functors.
Mod(T1) Mod(T
+
1 )
Mod(T2)
Π1
F ∗
Π2
Since T+1 is a definitional extension of T1, Π1 is an equivalence (Barrett and
Halvorson, 2016b, Propositions 5.1–3). By assumption F ∗ is an equivalence, so
this means that Π2 must be an equivalence too.
Now using the fact that Π2 is an equivalence, Beth’s theorem — in particular
a simple corollary to it (Barrett, 2017b, Corollary 1) — implies that for every
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predicate symbol p ∈ Σ1 there is a Σ2-formula ψ such that T+1  ∀x(p(x) ↔
ψ(x)). This gives us the following string of equivalences:
a ∈ pM ⇐⇒ a ∈ pM+ ⇐⇒ a ∈ ψM+ ⇐⇒ a ∈ ψΠ2(M+) ⇐⇒ a ∈ ψF∗(M)
(Here M+ is the unique model of T+1 that satisfies Π1(M
+) = M .) The first
equivalence follows from the definition of Π1, the second from our choice of
ψ, the third the definition of Π2, and the fourth from the fact that the above
diagram commutes. This means that pM = ψF
∗(M), so F ∗(M) defines all of the
structures of M , and the two models are therefore codeterminate.
This proposition shows us that if two theories are categorically equivalent
and the functor realizing the equivalence is suitably well behaved — in the sense
that it arises from a translation between the theories — then their models are
codeterminate.7 This demonstrates a sense in which categorical equivalence
satisfies our desideratum. Insofar as we take codetermination as our standard
of sameness of structure, this result gives us reason to say that categorically
equivalent theories have models with the same structure.
4 What is it to interpret a theory literally?
My aim in this last section is to address a worry that one might have about
categorical equivalence and other liberal standards of equivalence. The worry
is that if one endorses a standard of equivalence that is so liberal, then one is
forced away from scientific realism.
In order to be a scientific realist, one needs to take our best scientific theories
‘literally’ or ‘at face value’ (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 8). The most popular example
of a non-literal interpretation of our scientific theories traces back to the logical
positivists, whose view van Fraassen (1980, p. 10–11) describes as follows.
On the positivists’ interpretation of science, theoretical terms have
meaning only through their connection with the observable. Hence
they hold that two theories may in fact say the same thing although
in form they contradict each other. (Perhaps the one says that all
matter consists of atoms, while the other postulates instead a uni-
versal continuous medium; they will say the same thing nevertheless
if they agree in their observable consequences, according to the pos-
itivists.) But two theories which contradict each other in such a way
can ‘really’ be saying the same thing only if they are not literally
construed.
The positivists’ non-literal interpretation of theories goes hand-in-hand with
their commitment to empirical equivalence as the proper standard of equiva-
lence between theories. One might therefore worry that proponents of liberal
7Hudetz (2017) contains similar results which point to exactly the line of inquiry that
leads one to the above proposition. The standard of equivalence that he proposes, called
definable categorical equivalence, builds in ‘by hand’ the requirement that models be mapped
to codeterminate models.
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standards of equivalence like categorical equivalence are in a similar position
as the positivists. If there are categorically equivalent theories that contradict
one another, then this would mean that committing to categorical equivalence
forces us to take our theories non-literally, which in turn forces us away from
realism.
At first glance, one might worry that there are categorically equivalent the-
ories, like the following pair, that contradict one another when taken literally.
Example. General relativity is normally formulated geometrically by using a
smooth manifold with various structures on it. But in the early 1970s, Ge-
roch (1972) noticed that general relativity could also be formulated in a purely
algebraic fashion by using something called an “Einstein algebra.” One can
think of the elements of an Einstein algebra as the smooth scalar functions on
a spacetime.
Rosenstock et al. (2015) have recently shown that these two theories are
categorically equivalent. But in this case one might be tempted to say that
these two theories contradict one another if we take them literally. General
relativity ascribes a kind of ‘geometric structure’ to the world, whereas the
theory of Einstein algebras ascribes a kind of ‘algebraic structure’ to the world,
and these are radically different kinds of structures. For example, when we draw
models of these two theories (Barrett, 2017a), they look completely different,
suggesting that the two theories contradict one another. Their models provide
us with different pictures of the world. y
There are other categorically equivalent theories that one might worry con-
tradict one another, but this example will suffice for our purposes here. Simply
put, the worry is the following. Categorically equivalent theories might contra-
dict one another in terms of the structure they ascribe to the world, and if so,
then adopting categorical equivalence as our standard of equivalence forces us
into a form of anti-realism.
I would like to suggest that this worry about categorical equivalence and
other liberal standards of equivalence is misplaced. The claim that, for example,
general relativity and the theory of Einstein algebras contradict one another is
subtly rooted in the idea that we should use isomorphism as our standard for
when two objects have the same structure. If one takes isomorphism as the
proper standard of sameness of structure between models, then one does indeed
have good reason to think that categorically equivalent theories do literally
contradict one another. An Einstein algebra and a smooth manifold with metric
are not isomorphic, so the theories contradict one another in virtue of ascribing
different structure to the world. But we have seen that isomorphism is not a
satisfactory standard of sameness of structure.
If we adopt a reasonable notion of sameness of structure, then the idea that
categorically equivalent theories contradict one another disappears. General
relativity and the theory of Einstein algebras have codeterminate models. From
the starting point of a smooth manifold with Lorentzian metric, one can build an
Einstein algebra, and conversely, from the starting point of an Einstein algebra,
one can build a smooth manifold with Lorentzian metric. There is therefore
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a strong sense in which these two theories do not contradict one another in
terms of the structure they posit, so long as we adopt an appropriate notion
of sameness of structure. If one claims that general relativity and the theory
of Einstein algebras are inequivalent in virtue of the former positing geometric
structure and the latter positing algebraic structure, then one is taking these
theories too literally.
The proposition in the previous section guarantees that categorically equiv-
alent theories — so long as the functor realizing the equivalence is suitably well
behaved — will have have codeterminate models. So once we are clear about
all of the structures that models have — in particular, by being clear about
what structures are definable on these models — then we see that the models
of categorically equivalent theories have precisely the same structure, despite
the fact that they are not isomorphic. This means that adopting a more liberal
standard of equivalence, like categorical equivalence, need not be understood
as a move away from literal interpretation of our scientific theories. Rather,
it seems that standards of equivalence that are much stricter than categorical
equivalence are committing us to a kind of super -literal interpretation.
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